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THE DOMBROWSKI-TYPE SUIT AS AN EFFECTIVE
WEAPON FOR SOCIAL CHANGE: REFLECTIONS
FROM WITHOUT AND WITHIN
PART II-THE VIEW FROM WITHIN
Robert Allen Sedler*
I. THE DOMBROWSKI REMEDY FROM THE POLITICAL PERSPECTIVE
The Dombrowski remedy means that injunctive and declaratory relief is
available in the federal courts against vague and overbroad laws regulating or
applicable to acts of expression and against improper action by governmental
officials designed to inhibit the exercise of free expression. Part I of this article1
examined this remedy in the context of its effect upon the inevitable conflict
between those who are seeking to bring about social change and those who are
using their control of the governmental apparatus to resist it. Control of the
governmental apparatus is obviously a powerful weapon and the availability
of the Dombrowski remedy helps to redress the balance between those seeking
to bring about social change and those seeking to resist it.
This portion of the article will elaborate on how this balance is redressed,
particularly from what may be termed the political perspective. The term,
"political" is used, in its broadest sense, primarily to refer to the impact of the
availability of the Dombrowski-type remedy on the remainder of society-
those whom the advocates of social change are trying to influence. There are
two elements to this "political impact" thesis. The first is that insofar as the
successful Dombrowski-type suit restrains governmental action against the
advocates of social change, it removes one of the most effective weapons from
the government's arsenal, namely the use of law enforcement to turn public
opinion against social change. Law enforcement, particularly by way of
criminal prosecutions, enables the government to brand the advocates of social
change as "wrongdoers" or "subversives." The threat of such enforcement will
deter many people from participating in movements for social change and will
cause them to "stay away" from those who are so engaged. In addition, prosecu-
tions require the advocates of social change to "go on the defensive," to expend
time and money defending themselves, thereby rendering them less effective in
achieving their primary objective. To the extent that movement people are
in fact imprisoned, even temporarily, they are diverted from this objective and
are "removed from the scene." All of this was recognized by the Supreme
Court in Dombrowski, and clearly was the basis for making this remedy avail-
able to the targets of governmental action.
The second element of the thesis is that the Dombrowski-type remedy may
have political significance even if the suit itself is unsuccessful. The fact that
* Professor of Law, University of Kentucky. A.B. 1956, J.D. 1959, University of Pittsburgh.
'18 KAN. L. REV. 237 (1970).
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those threatened by governmental action can initially put the government on
the defensive may, particularly if combined with direct political action, also
prevent or minimize the repressive power of government. This can occur in a
number of ways. The Dombrowski-type suit gives the "social change people"
the opportunity to try to expose the real purpose behind the threatened govern-
mental action and to obtain public support for their position. The fact that a
suit has been filed-just as the fact that a prosecution has been initiated-im-
plies some form of "wrongdoing" on the part of the defendants, even if the
suit is ultimately unsuccessful. Likewise the filing of a suit encourages the
"potential victims" and, psychologically, provides an "umbrella of protection,"
encouraging resistance to the repressive action and the continuation of efforts
to achieve social change. Finally, the threat of a Dombrowski-type suit may in
some cases cause governmental officials to hesitate before acting against the
advocates of social change. In other words, Dombrowski may go further
toward redressing the balance than realized. It may provide not only a legal
weapon against repression, but an important "political-legal" one as well.
The above conclusion is based on the author's "reflections from within."
The possibility of a Dombrowski-type suit when repression2 is threatened or
begun has, in the author's observation, firmed up the determination to resist.
It has provided a rallying point and reduced the "fallout" that usually results
when the government indicates its intention to act against those trying to
achieve social change. It has had effects going beyond the suit itself and inde-
pendent of the "legal result."
Both elements of this thesis will be illustrated by a detailed consideration
from the political perspective of two Dombrowski-type suits in which the
author was involved. The first grew out of the arrests of anti-poverty workers
in Pike County, Kentucky, and their prosecutions for "teaching sedition." The
Dombrowski-type suit, McSurely v. Ratliff,' in which the author represented
the Kentucky Civil Liberties Union as amicus curiae,4 was successful and the
prosecutions were stopped. If the prosecutions had been allowed to continue,
the efforts to bring about social change in that part of Appalachian Kentucky
would have been severely hindered, even though any convictions would ulti-
mately have been reversed. It is this case which will illustrate the first element
of my thesis, which may be called the "recognized" one,5 that law enforcement,
even if unsuccessful, has great political significance in repressing efforts at
social change.
The second situation involved two "legally unsuccessful suits," Braden v.
Nunn,' and Black Unity League of Kentucky v. Miller,' designed to halt the
'That what is happening constitutes "repression" represents my value judgment. Others may see it as
the "upholding of law and order" and the "protection of society from revolution."
'282 F. Supp. 848 (E.D. Ky. 1967).
' Both in seating arrangement and in the practical conduct of the case, the counsel for plaintiffs and
the counsel for the amicus curiae were as one. See Krislov, The Amicus Curiae Brief: From Friendship
to Advocacy, 72 YALE L.J. 694 (1963).
'In Dombrowski itself. See 380 U.S. 479 (1965).
'No. 18,849 (6th Cir. May 5, 1969).
7394 U.S. 100 (1969).
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operations of the Kentucky Un-American Activities Committee (KUAC).
Although the suits were unsuccessful, KUAC ceased to function and never
succeeded in becoming an effective instrument of repression. It is my belief,
and the belief of those who organized against KUAC, that the immediate
filing of a Dombrowski-type suit was the focal point of this organized opposi-
tion and had a great deal to do with the ultimate political victory. If this
remedy had not been available, the history of KUAC in Kentucky might have
been very different. It is these reflections from within that truly persuade me
that the Dombrowski remedy demonstrates most clearly how the law of
remedies operates as a social institution.
II. SEDITION IN PIKE COUNTY: THE POLITICAL SIGNIFICANCE OF PREVENTING A
CRIMINAL PROSECUTION
Pike County, Kentucky, lies in the heart of Appalachia, and as one writer
has observed, "has all the attributes associated with that colonized poverty
pocket."' It is perhaps the largest coal-producing county in the nation,' but as
in the rest of Appalachia this fact has not brought prosperity to the people.
The situation has been described by Harry Caudill, a noted eastern Kentucky
lawyer and author," as follows:
Appalachia is a beautiful country whose major resource is bituminous coal. Its
wooded hills are stuffed with the fuel, and mining has shaped its tragic history....
Until about 1948 coal was an immense industry, the counterpart of steel. As
a mass employer, it was beset by oil and gas and advancing mining technology,
and collapsed abruptly. Scores of coal companies were forced out of business in
the 1950's, and those remaining in operation were compelled to mechanize to an
astonishing degree. Thus hordes of industrial workmen were left stranded in the
mining communities. They were men who had been educated for the mines; their
communities were poorly built and were without decent schools, hospitals or roads.
In the last decade the jerry-built communities have turned into people-sties. The
land is scarred with crumbling shacks, tipples, commissaries, and culm heaps. The
demoralized people, long dependent on public assistance for their bread, have
littered the roadsides and streams with countless automobile hulks and trash dumps.
The creeks and rivers are reeking sewers. 1
The local leadership in these areas has been described by another writer as
consisting of "a few closely knit families that run the town, self-reliant, wary of
outsiders, puritanical and conservative."' 2 In all of Eastern Kentucky it is
accurate to refer to a "power structure," comprised of political leaders, banking,
coal and business interests. It is they who control what employment is avail-
Mason, The Subversive Poor, 207 NATION 721 (1968).
'Id.
"His book, NIGHT COMES TO THE CUMBERLANDS (1962), is a classic work in the study of Appalachian
Kentucky.
- Caudill, Misdeal in Appalachia, 215 ATLANTIC MONTHLY 45 (1965).
'Arnold, Sedition in the Hills and Hollows of Kentucky, National Observer, Aug. 28, 1967, at 1,
col ...... In a larger area such as Pike County different groups compete for political power along traditional
party lines.
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able; the political leaders administer the welfare program, the primary source
of income for many people living there.
It is into this situation that "anti-poverty" workers-young, nonconformist
and frequently uncompromising18-have been coming for the last few years.
The position of the "power structure" in Pike County, as expressed by Thomas
B. Ratliff, the prosecuting attorney and former president of the Independent
Coal Operators Association, is that "[a]ll AV (Appalachian Volunteers)14 is
doing is agitating and organizing, stirring up rich against poor and class
hatred. Its director is a member of a number of far-left-wing radical organiza-
tions .... Our government is spending millions of dollars to fight communism
10,000 miles away in Vietnam while communism gains a foothold here at
home."15 "What you had was a bunch of damn long-haired barefoot beatniks
and hippies running around town up to no good and setting up this High-
lander folk school right in Pikeville. Why they had a plan for infiltrating the
schools and churches. They tried to start a Red Guard like in China with our
teenagers. We don't want them. Let them go back to Berkeley where they
belong."' 6 From* the standpoint of the anti-poverty workers, as expressed by
Joe Mulloy, one of those charged with "teaching sedition": "The people who
control things are the ones who are making money off the present system.
That's why they're so dead set against AV, because its their pocketbooks that
will be hurt by change."" It was not difficult to foresee that the Pike County
"power structure" would wish to use that power to repress the anti-poverty
workers in their efforts to "change things in the mountains."
Experience indicates, however, that repression will not be undertaken until
the efforts at achieving social change show some signs of being effective. On
the whole, such efforts had not been particularly effective in Eastern Kentucky.
A traditional conservatism and suspicion of outsiders, coupled with a rather
fatalistic philosophy, had made any effort at social change most difficult.
Added to this was the dependency, real or imagined, on "the government" for
welfare payments as the principal source of livelihood for many people. While
local government officials had been annoyed at the anti-poverty workers, they
had not felt themselves threatened. But, in Pike County, in the summer of
1967, they began to feel themselves threatened.
The threat came in the form of organized opposition to strip-mining,
which opposition succeeded in preventing at least one strip-mining operation.
Strip-mining essentially consists of cutting around the contour of a mountain
so that the miners can get directly at the coal. Such an operation may produce
harmful side effects. 8 In that regard, the Kentucky General Assembly stated:
151d.
"The Appalachian Volunteers (AV) is an anti-poverty organization, which has been supported by
Office of Economic Opportunity grants as well as by private contributions.
' Arnold, supra note 12, at 13.10Id.
t7 Id.
"'See Berry, Strip-Mine Morality: The Landscaping of Hell, 202 NATION 96 (1966).
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[T]he unregulated strip mining of coal causes soil erosion, stream pollution, the
accumulation of stagnant water and the seepage of contaminated water, increases
the likelihood of floods, destroys the value of land for agricultural purposes,
counteracts efforts for the conservation of soil, water and other natural resources,
destroys or impairs the property rights of citizens, creates fire hazards, and in gen-
eral creates hazards to life and property, so as to constitute an imminent and in-
ordinate peril to the welfare of the Commonwealth.' 9
In 1966 the General Assembly enacted a comprehensive system regulating strip-
mining, but the effectiveness of the regulations has been a matter of some dis-
pute.2" The situation of the landowner on whose property strip-mining may be
done is aggravated by the fact that in Kentucky standard "broad form" min-
eral deeds have been construed to allow strip-mining, and to relieve the oper-
ator from liability for the resulting damage to the surface.2' The strip-mining
controversy pitted the coal operators and commercial interests against the small
landowners whose property is covered by broad form deeds, the residents of
the "hollows" who fear landslides and destruction of their property, and the
conservationists who see the beauty of the region being despoiled.
Various citizens' groups, such as the Appalachian Group to Save the Land
and People, have been formed to resist the continuation of strip mining by
educational programs and political action. However, in the spring and sum-
mer of 1967 a more active kind of resistance was under way. In Knott County
night raiders blew up a $50,000 diesel-powered shovel at its stripping site.22
But the most dramatic and publicized resistance took place in Pike County.
There a small landowner, Jink Ray, and his neighbors lay down in front of
the bulldozers of the Puritan Coal Co. which were about to strip-mine his
land. The company obtained an injunction against such interference, but it
was disregarded. In the meantime "Jink Ray's stand" was receiving wide-
spread publicity, and Governor Edward Breathitt ordered a temporary suspen-
sion of Puritan's permit under the state strip-mining law on the ground that
it would endanger homes in the hollow. On August 1, the State Department
of Natural Resources revoked Puritan's permit to strip-mine in Pike County.2
One of the most prominent figures in "Jink Ray's stand" was Joe Mulloy,
a young anti-poverty worker employed by the Appalachian Volunteers.24 The
Appalachian Volunteers had been aiding the Appalachian Group to Save the
Land and People and Mulloy stood out in this effort. During the last week of
July, 1967, the Pike County Sheriff, a representative of the Small Business Ad-
ministration, and Robert Holcomb, president of the Pikeville Chamber of
Commerce, made a brief visit to Mulloy's home, and questioned him about
what he was doing in Pike County and specifically about his anti-strip-mining
"Ky. REv. STAT. S 350.020 (1969) (Declaration of Legislative Policy and Finding of Fact).
2°Fetterman, Kentucky's Still Ravaged Land, Louisville Courier-Journal & Times, Sept. 10, 1967
(Magazine), at 4.
See Martin v. Kentucky Oak Mining Co., 429 S.W.2d 395 (Ky., 1968).
'Mason, supra note 8, at 722.
'Good, Kentucky's Coal Beds of Sedition, 205 NATION 167, 168 (1967).
"When he subsequently announced that he would resist the draft, he was discharged by the AV's.
He was then employed by the Southern Conference Educational Fund.
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activities. That evening Holcomb called for an investigation of the Appa-
lachian Volunteers in Pike County.25
At the same time attention was also focused on Alan and Margaret Mc-
Surely, anti-poverty workers employed by the Southern Conference Educa-
tional Fund. That organization was the plaintiff in the original Dombrowski
suit and it was as "popular" with governmental officials in Kentucky as it had
been in Louisiana. The McSurelys, however, were not engaged in organizing
activities, but were primarily producing literature for future distribution and
were developing a "strategy for organizing."2 They were close friends of Joe
Mulloy and his wife and Pike County officials were aware of the association.
The Jink Ray affair marked a clear change in organizing tactics and objectives.
As Joe Mulloy observed: "We wasted our time for a couple of years setting
up community centers, repairing school houses, providing fun and games for
the youngsters-all of which is incidental to the main concern. A life and
death struggle is going on in strip mining here that can spell doom to the
future of this area. The only way to end it is to organize people, to get them
together to voice their demands."27 The Jink Ray affair may also have shown
what was meant by effective organizing-a means by which poor people
could get together and make their influence felt. And if Jink Ray's land was
saved, could not other strip-miners be opposed as well? It was time for the
"power structure" to respond.2"
The response took place on August 11, 1967. Led by Prosecutor Thomas
B. Ratliff, who was also the Republican candidate for Lieutenant-Governor in
the fall election, and Pike County Sheriff, Perry Justice, a party of fifteen
armed men, pursuant to a warrant, conducted midnight raids on the Mulloy
and McSurely homes, ransacking them and among other things impounding
"564 loose books, twenty-six posters, and twenty-two boxes of books, pamphlets,
and other private and published documents found in the McSurley home."29
Books and papers found in the Mulloy home were also seized. Mulloy, Alan
McSurely, and his wife, Margaret, who was six months pregnant, were arrested
and charged with the offense of "teaching sedition."3 ° Prosecutor Ratliff com-
mented on the raids, saying that the material taken from the McSurelys in-
cluded a "white paper on how to take over Pike County from the power struc-
ture and put it in the hands of the poor." "Every piece of evidence we have
points to just one objective," said Ratliff, "to stir up dissension and create tur-
moil among our poor." He also promised that the confiscated material would
be made available "to Washington," and that it would be used to try to con-
vince the Office of Economic Opportunity that federal funds should be with-
drawn from the Appalachian Volunteers and VISTA.3 Mulloy was released
W Mason, supra note 8, at 722.
'Arnold, supra note 12, at 13.
'"Id.
' Id.
'McSurely v. Ratliff, 282 F. Supp. 848, 850 (E.D. Ky. 1967).
'o Louisville Courier-Journal, August 13, 1967, at ., col ......
" Joe Mulloy's wife, Karen, was employed as a VISTA. She was not arrested, however.
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on bond, but the McSurelys remained in jail and filed a motion for release on
habeas corpus. This was denied,32 and they eventually made bail. There was
an immediate "political fallout." The state Attorney-General promised his
support to the Pike County officials, stating that he was "really concerned about
an organization such as the Southern Conference Educational Fund operating
in Kentucky."83 On August 18, three days after the federal suit had been filed,
Governor Edward T. Breathitt and Office of Economic Opportunity Director
Sergeant Shriver issued a joint announcement that the Appalachian Volun-
teers would lose all federal funding in Kentucky as of September L"' The
Governor recommended the cutoff "in the best interest of the needy people in
Kentucky," and the community action council director of a program covering
Pike County stated, "The people here just don't want them, it would behoove
us to get them out of our area."35 Some of the OEO funds were later rein-
stated, but no new funds were granted despite a confidential OEO report that
laid the arrests to "obvious political interests."36
The first hearing before the three-judge federal court was held on Septem-
ber 1. At that time Prosecutor Ratliff promised the court that he would take
no action against Mulloy and the McSurelys until the court issued its ruling."
However, on September 5, Pike County Circuit Judge James B. Stephenson
ordered the Grand Jury to proceed with its investigation of the charges despite
Ratliff's assurances to the federal court. He ordered Ratliff and the other de-
fendants in the federal suit to answer questions, and not surprisingly they
complied.8 On September 11, the Grand Jury issued a report and returned
indictments not only against Mulloy and the McSurleys, but also against Carl
Braden and his wife Anne. 9 Anne Braden had never been in Pike County
and Carl had been there only once before. They were going there at the time
to post bond for the McSurelys and when they were late in arriving, the judge
issued a bench warrant for their arrest. They refused to post bond and were
imprisoned. 9 The indictment of the Bradens, who had never been involved
in Pike County activities, demonstrates most clearly the political nature of the
proceedings. Carl Braden, the defendant in an earlier sedition case, is Ken-
tucky's "red scare," just as James Dombrowski, the director of the Southern
Conference Educational Fund at the time of the New Orleans raids, was
Louisiana's "red scare." By indicting the Bradens, the trial would necessarily
be one of "communists," and since Mulloy and the McSurelys would be identi-
fied with the Bradens, they would be "communists" also.
The report of the Grand Jury made clear the line of attack. Anti-poverty
efforts in Pike County were a part of a "communist plot to overthrow the
Louisville Courier-Journal, August 15, 1967, at ..... cl.
Louisville Courier-Journal, August 15, 1967, at ..... col ...
"Lexington Leader, August 18, 1967, at .... col.....
5 Id.
"Mason, supra note 8, at 722.
'Louisville Courier-Journal, September 2, 1967, at ... , col ......





government of Pike County by force and violence." The Grand Jury stated
the following conclusions:
I. That a well-organized and well-financed effort is being made to promote and spread
the communistic theory of the violent and forceful overthrow of the government
of Pike County.
2. That communist organizers have been sent to Pike County by radical organizations
which have paid them, supported them, furnished them with printed propaganda
materials, controlled them and directed their work.
3. That some employees of the Appalachian Volunteers and other federally-financed
anti-poverty programs have collaborated with known communist organizers to
help them organize and promote the violent overthrow of the constitutional govern-
ment of Pike County ....
4. That local officials of the A.V. have cooperated with known communist organizers
by allowing them to conduct training sessions among Vista workers, Peace Corps
trainees, A.V. workers, and local citizens in which sessions these organizers were
allowed to state their views.
5. That local officials of the A.V. have permitted known communists to take part in
the writing of editorials in A.V. sponsored community newspapers and in directing
schools sponsored and supported by the A.V.
6. That A.V. have permitted known communists to infiltrate, influence and take part
in community protests and projects when the A.V. knew full well that the purpose
of these organizers was to exploit the local people and their cause so as to promote
violence against the local government and the local courts.
7. That communist organizers have attempted, without success thus far, to promote
their beliefs among our school children by infiltrating our local government.
8. That communist organizers are attempting and planning to infiltrate local churches
and labor unions in order to cause dissension and to promote their purposes.
9. That communist organizers are attempting to form Community Unions with the
eventual purpose of organizing armed groups to be known as "Red Guards" and
through which the actual forceful overthrow of the local government would be
accomplished.41
It recommended, among other things, that the federal grant to the Appalachian
Volunteers be cancelled, and that if the present sedition laws were declared
unconstitutional, the legislature should pass new laws "which would control
such activities in the future." Finally, it concluded that there was no evidence
that the charges "were made or were prompted because of strip mining or for
political purposes," and that "in fact we found very little evidence that those
accused have played any constructive or sincere part in protesting coal mining
practices in Pike County."
Presumably at the trial, evidence to support these charges would have been
introduced. The Bradens would have been made out as "communists," and the
McSurelys, employed by the Southern Conference Educational Fund, would
probably have been shown to be "communists" as well. Mulloy and the other
Appalachian Volunteers would have been tainted as "communist sympathizers"
or "dupes." All attacks that had been made against the "power structure"
"1 Report of the Grand Jury of Pike County for September, 1967, pp. 3-5 (emphasis added). See also
Louisville Courier-Journal, supra note 38.
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would then have been seen as part of a "communist plot" to overthrow the
government of Pike County. The "good people" of Pike County would
probably have refused to associate with the "communists," either in strip
mining protests or in anything else. As defendants in the criminal prosecu-
tion, Mulloy, the McSurleys and the Bradens would have been placed in an
impossible situation. To the extent that they would have tried to deny the
"communist" charge, they would have been playing into the hands of the
prosecutor, who could say that "every communist denies this." The suspicion
would be planted. It is almost impossible to believe that the jury would not
have returned a verdict of guilty. This would indelibly have branded the
anti-poverty workers as "communists" in the minds of the people in the area.
Assuming that the conviction would later have been reversed, it could be
said that this was on a technicality. In other words, if the case were allowed
to come to trial, the government officials would have the political victory
irrespective of the final result. They would have succeeded in their objective
of branding the anti-poverty workers as "communists"--"after all, the jury
said they were communists, didn't they?"-thereby destroying their effective-
ness.
On September 14, the three-judge court held a hearing on the plaintiffs'
motion for a temporary restraining order to block the prosecutions. At that
time prosecutor Ratliff indicated specifically the kind of evidence he would
have introduced at the state trial and how that trial would have been con-
ducted." He proposed to show that:
(1) Mrs. McSurely and the Bradens attended a meeting in Nashville, Tennessee, at
which Stokely Carmichael spoke, and riots broke out in Nashville immediately
afterwards;
(2) That Mrs. McSurely was formerly a worker for the Student Non-Violent Co-
ordinating Committee;
(3) That the McSurelys were distributing literature advocating a Viet Cong victory
in Vietnam and discussing the views of various "communist philosophers."
On cross-examination Mrs. McSurely also was asked whether she knew H. Rap
Brown, which she admitted. Prosecutor Ratliff prompted laughter on the part
of the spectators-most of whom were University of Kentucky law students-
when he asked Mrs. Braden, "Have you ever been a card-carrying member of
the Communist Party ?""4 She replied that she had never seen such a card.4
All in all, the proceedings in the federal court that day demonstrated the kind
of "political trial" that would have occurred if the prosecutions had been al-
lowed to continue.
But they were not. Much to the surprise of everyone, including the plain-
tiffs, the court immediately rendered a decision on the merits, holding that the
Dombrowski-type suit was proper and that the statute was unconstitutional on
"Lexington Leader, September 14, 1967, at ..... col ......
'" Carl Braden observed afterwards that when this question was asked at his "first sedition trial,"
there was a hushed silence in the courtroom. Things have changed for the better somewhat.
"Lexington Herald, September 15, 1967, at ..... col ......
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its face as violative of the first amendment as well as being superseded by
federal law. All further prosecutions were enjoined. One judge dissented on
the ground that federal injunctive relief was barred by 28 U.S.C. § 2283. 45
At this point it may be well to consider what would have happened if the
Dombrowski-type remedy had not been available. The statute under which
Mulloy and the McSurelys were indicted was such that in the words of the
court, "It is difficult to believe that capable lawyers could seriously contend that
this statute is constitutional." 46 Its unconstitutionality was so evident that it
was almost impossible to write a brief outlining all the reasons why. It was
enacted in 1920, and had never been interpreted by the Kentucky Court of
Appeals. No conviction under it had ever been sustained. As the federal
court observed:
The statute in question is clearly unconstitutional even under the most flexible
yardstick. It is too broad and too vague. It contravenes the First Amendment to
the Constitution of the United States because it unduly prohibits freedom of speech,
freedom of the press, and the right of assembly. It fails to distinguish between the
advocacy of ideas and the advocacy of action. It makes it a criminal offense merely
to possess, with intent to circulate, literature on the subject of sedition. It imposes
the penalty of imprisonment for advocating an unpopular political belief. It would
turn the courts into a forum for argument of political theories with imprisonment
the penalty for the loser. It contains no requirement of criminal intent. The un-
wary and the ignorant could be enmeshed in the dragnet as easily as the covert
plotter. 48
But this was equally true in 1954 when Carl Braden, now the Executive Direc-
tor of the Southern Conference Educational Fund, who was also charged in
McSurely, was convicted of sedition in a state court in Louisville. The circum-
stances leading to the conviction-which arose from the fact that he purchased
a home for a Negro in a "white suburb" have been detailed elsewhere.4' The
charge was "advocating, suggesting or teaching the duty, necessity, propriety
or expediency of criminal syndicalism or sedition." Carl Braden's trial lasted
from November 29, 1954 to December 13, 1954. He was convicted and sen-
tenced to fifteen years' imprisonment. The following description of the trial
is taken from the report in I. F. Stone's Weekly:5"
Before the jury . . .were paraded some of the most notorious informers em-
ployed by the immigration service and the F.B.I. Ben Gitlow,, Matt Svetic and
Maurice Melkin were on hand to testify on the nature of the Communist conspiracy
and the literature seized in a raid on the homes of the indicted. "Mere possession
of such literature," the Commonwealth's Attorney, Hamilton, argued "raises a
presumption of guilt."
"282 F. Supp. at 855.
"282 F. Supp. at 852.
"See Braden v. Commonwealth, 291 S.W.2d 843 (Ky. 1956); Loveless v. Commonwealth, 241 Ky.
82, 43 S.W.2d 348 (1931); Gregory v. Commonwealth, 226 Ky. 617, 11 S.W.2d 432 (1928).
"282 F. Supp. at 851.
"A. BRADEN, THE WALL BETWEEN (1958).
"December 20, 1954, p. 4.
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Braden denied that he ever was or ever had been a Communist but admitted
to being a lifelong socialist, interested in many labor and peace causes. "They
want us to disarm," the prosecutor said in his summation to the jury, "so we can
be taken over without much difficulty."
The prosecutor asked the jury to convict and make the case "a milestone" in
ending "this setting whites against blacks .... "
The result in the trial of Carl Braden was exactly the result which the court in
McSurely prophesied would have occurred had a prosecution under that law
been allowed to take place. It had already happened in 1954. Carl Braden's
bond was set at $40,000 and he languished in prison for eight months until it
could be raised. When the case reached the Kentucky Court of Appeals, it
was reversed on the narrow ground of federal pre-emption, because the indict-
ment also charged teaching sedition against the United States.5 The Court
did not reach the first amendment question and specifically referred to the
possibility of a prosecution for sedition "directed exclusively against the Com-
monwealth of Kentucky." In Carl Braden's "first sedition case" it was almost
two years from arrest to "vindication." In his second, the McSurely case, it
was three days for him and his wife, and a month for the others. This alone
demonstrates one difference that the availability of the Dombrowski remedy
makes.
More importantly, the same kind of "political trial" that occurred in Carl
Braden's case could have occurred in the Pike County case as well. This is
evidenced by the action of the state courts in denying the McSurely's motion
for release on habeas corpus, the prosecutor's statements concerning the kind
of evidence that he would have introduced if the trial had been allowed to
proceed, and the "political fallout" noted above. Thus the effect of the Dom-
browski-type remedy-a little more than a month after the first arrests had
been made, the threat of prosecution and a political trial were no more. In
the eyes of the public the plaintiffs had been vindicated, or at least had not
been "proved" to be communists. The officials had been found "in the wrong"
by the federal courts, and it may be significant to note that prosecutor Ratliff
failed to carry Pike County in his race for Lieutenant-Governor. An effective
political weapon-prosecutions for "teaching sedition" so as to brand anti-
poverty workers as "communists"-had been removed from the arsenal of the
Pike County officials. The Dombrowski-type remedy, which prevented the
prosecutions from taking place, 2 had demonstrated its political significance in
the struggle between anti-poverty workers and the "power structure" in Pike
County, Kentucky.53
' Braden v. Commonwealth, 291 S.W.2d 843 (Ky. 1956). The reversal was on the basis of Pennsyl-
vania v. Nelson, 350 U.S. 497 (1956).
'See the text at note 1, supra.
'The story does not have a happy ending. After protracted litigation, the Sixth Circuit ordered that
the seized documents be returned. McSurely v. Ratliff, 398 F.2d 817 (6th Cir. 1968). In the meantime,
they had been turned over to the Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, commonly referred
to as the McClellan Committee, which had copied them and returned them to what was purportedly
"official custody." That Committee issued a subpoena duces tecum, requiring the McSurelys to produce
the documents before the committee. Upon their refusal to do so, they were indicted for contempt. They
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III. THE KENTUCKY UN-AMERICAN ACTIVITIES COMMiTTEE: "LEGAL DEFEAT"
AND "POLITICAL VICTORY"
A most powerful weapon for the inhibition and suppression of dissent has
been the legislative investigating committee, looking into "subversion," "un-
American activities," "internal security," and the like. Although the Supreme
Court may have stated that, "There is no congressional power to expose for the
sake of exposure," 4 this is in fact what such committees constantly do and
what they are set up to do. Kentucky had been spared this institution until the
spring of 1968, when the General Assembly by concurrent resolution estab-
lished the Kentucky Un-American Activities Committee. The likely targets
of legislative wrath were "communist organizations" operating in Kentucky,
anti-poverty workers who were "stirring up our poor," black militants, who
were beginning to appear in the urban areas, and the "radical" professors who
were creating "student dissidents" at the state-supported schools. The preamble
to House Resolution No. 84 stated:
WHEREAS, this state and this country face grave public danger from enemies
both within and without our boundaries, and
WHEREAS, these subversive groups and persons under color of protection
afforded by the Bill of Rights of the United States Constitution seek to destroy us
and the ideals for which we fought to preserve and subject us to the domination of
foreign powers and ideologies,....
The committee was directed to:
...study, analyze and investigate all facts relating directly or indirectly to the
subject expressed in the recitals of this resolution; to the activities of groups and
organizations which have as their objectives, or as part of their objectives, the over-
throw of the Commonwealth of Kentucky, or of the United States by force, violence
or other unlawful means; to all organizations known to be or suspected of being
dominated or controlled by a power seeking to impose a foreign political theory
upon the government and people of the United States; to all persons who belong to
or are affiliated with such groups or organizations; and to the manner and extent
to which such activities affect the safety, welfare and security of this state in Na-
tional Defense, the functioning of any state agency, unemployment relief and other
forms of public assistance, educational institutions in this state including but not
limited to the operation, effect, administration, enforcement and needed revision
of any and all laws in any way bearing upon or relating to the subject of this
resolution. 55
The usual powers, including the subpoena power, were granted.
While the mandate itself makes it clear that the purpose of the committee
was not limited to "providing information for legislation," the statements of
then brought a Dombrowski-type suit against the committee members, and both the suit and the con-
tempt proceeding are now pending. On December 13, 1968, their home was dynamited, and they barely
escaped death or serious injury. They subsequently left Pike County. Joe Mulloy, anticipating induction
into the Armed Forces following the refusal of his draft board to classify him as a conscientious objector,
also left Pike County. He is currently under a five-year prison sentence for refusing induction. Organizing
activities are still going on in Pike County, but the victims of the 1967 raids remain under attack.
" Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178, 187, 200 (1954).
'House Resolution No. 84, Kentucky General Assembly, March 11, 1968.
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the sponsor and other legislators show rather conclusively that the only purpose
was to "expose subversion in Kentucky." The sponsor of the bill, Rep. Lloyd
Clapp, was quoted in a newspaper interview as follows:
Rep. Clapp told the Kernel that the committee was created for a "dual pur-
pose"-to institute an educational and informational system and to "show the points
where the Communists are working on our weaker points."
He said he envisions a return of the American people to the "neighborliness"
of former times.
"This is not a witch hunt," Rep. Clapp said. "I just want to point out to the
American people that we are losing our sense of discipline toward government,
patriotism and love of government."
He said the immediate event that motivated his sponsorship of the bill came
when the Southern Conference Educational Fund moved its office to Louisville.
"If members of a group believe in a foreign form of government," he said, "they
should not be allowed free speech." 56
The floor debates were equally enlightening. One senator said that the chief
benefit of the committee was that it would "bring into light the activities of
the Southern Conference Educational Fund," which he identified as a "key
apparatus of communism in the United States," observing that, "We need to
enlighten the people of Kentucky what the Communist Party is doing right
here on their front door." 7 Another legislator stated, "We don't realize it,
but Communists are working all around us," while still another warned that,
"These hippies and beatniks and assorted reds and pinks are right in our
midst.""
In the pre-Dombrowski days a legislative investigating committee ordinarily
would have a free hand and any response would have to be a defensive one.59
The committee could conduct its hearings, usually with great fanfare, first
calling "friendly" witnesses to expose the "subversives." Then the "subversives"
would be called. If they refused to appear, they could be cited for contempt.
If they appeared, they would be subject to questioning about their beliefs and
associations and to the pillorying that usually accompanied such an investiga-
tion." If they refused to answer such questions, they could be labelled as "Fifth
or First Amendment communists," and could also be cited for contempt. Some
time later they might be vindicated,"' but even this was not always true." In
any event, the threat of investigation by a legislative committee was a formid-
able weapon to be wielded against "subversives" working for social change.
' Kentucky Kernel, March 26, 1968, at ..... col ......
'Louisville Times, March 16, 1968, at...., col ......
'Louisville Courier-Journal, March 12, 1968, at ..... col ......
'See Pauling v. Eastland, 288 F.2d 126 (D.C. Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 900 (1960). Cf.
Jordan v. Hutcheson, 323 F.2d 597 (4th Cir. 1963).
'It was the alleged pillorying by the House Un-American Activities Committee that was the basis of
the plaintiffs' claim in Stamler v. Willis, 415 F.2d 1365 (7th Cir. 1969).
"See, e.g., DeGregory v. Attorney-General of New Hampshire, 383 U.S. 825 (1966); Gibson v.
Florida Legislative Investigation Comm., 372 U.S. 539 (1963); Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234
(1957); Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178 (1954).
'See Braden v. United States, 365 U.S. 431 (1961); Wilkinson v. United States, 365 U.S. 399 (1961);
Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109 (1959); Uphaus v. Wyman, 360 U.S. 72 (1959).
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Doubtless, sponsors of the Kentucky Un-American Activities Committee
envisioned the same role for their "creation." The Kentucky Legislature was
going to act against subversives, and KUAC, like the other "little HUACS,"
was going to be its instrument. It was going on the offensive and would ex-
pose the "communists" and "subversives" who had infiltrated the universities,
the anti-poverty programs, and indeed every "movement for social change."
The final approval for the establishment of the committee was given by the
Kentucky Senate on March 15, 1968.3 Under the resolution, which did not
go into effect until 90 days after the end of the legislative session, the Governor
was to appoint the ten members of the committee, five from the House and
five from the Senate. The first suit, Braden v. Nunn,6 4 was filed on March 25,
shortly after the legislature adjourned. The plaintiffs fell into three categories:
(1) organizations working for social change in Kentucky; (2) officials of those
organizations; (3) university professors, numbered among whom was the
author. The Southern Conference Educational Fund and the Bradens, express
targets of the committee according to its sponsors, were considered our "most
affected plaintiffs," though under our theory the other plaintiffs were affected
as well. The relief sought was a declaration that the resolution was void on
its face and an injunction restraining the Governor from appointing anyone
to the committee.
We realized that standing would be our most difficult problem. Our theory
was as follows: The existence of a legislative investigating committee operat-
ing under a vague and overbroad mandate and established for the purpose of
exposing "subversion" would have a chilling effect upon the exercise of first
amendment rights by our plaintiffs and members of the class they represented,
namely persons seeking to achieve social change through the exercise of those
rights. Secondly, it was contended that the investigations would be under-
taken for the purpose of harassing and intimidating our plaintiffs and the class
of which they were members so as to deter them from exercising their first
amendment rights. In other words, we were contending that the Dombrowski
remedy carried with it its own standing rule: persons and groups working to
achieve social change have standing to challenge the operations of a legislative
investigating committee on the ground that the mandate under which the
committee is operating will have a chilling effect on their first amendment
activities and on the ground that the committee was established to harass and
intimidate them in the exercise of their first amendment rights. Relying on
Liveright v. Joint Legislative Investigating Committee," we contended that
the resolution establishing the committee created the impermissible chilling
effect, so that the suit could be maintained even prior to the time the com-
mittee was appointed and began its activities. Implicit in our standing argu-
ment was the argument that Dombrowski requires that the operations of a
'Louisville Courier-Journal, March 16, 1968, at ..... col ......
" No. 18,849 (6th Cir., May 5, 1969).
' 279 F. Supp. 205 (M.D. Tenn. 1968).
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committee operating under a vague and overbroad mandate and for the pur-
pose of "harassment" be halted as soon as possible, and that persons whose ac-
tivities would necessarily be chilled by those operations were the proper ones
to make that challenge.6
The District Judge was not impressed, and on May 27, 1968, he dismissed
the suit, refusing to certify the necessity for the convention of a three-judge
court on the ground that the complaint was "obviously without merit." But
this was not before the attorneys for the state6" had at the hearing made a
very interesting response to our challenge. As far as they were concerned, all
the committee was going to do was to investigate the operations of the agencies
of the state government and "things that have an effect on it." Gone was the
talk about "exposing Communists" and "showing where the Communists are
working on our weaker points." As the Deputy Attorney-General assured the
court: "This resolution is not a witch hunt. It's not an exposure for exposure's
sake, as the federal cases talk about. It is simply designed to allow the
Legislature of Kentucky, through a duly authorized legislative committee of
the Legislature, to determine what needs to be done to better administer and
enforce our law ... ." The statements of the sponsors of the resolution were
also specifically disclaimed.6" This kind of response pointed up very clearly
the dilemma that the filing of a Dombrowski-type suit necessarily creates for
a legislative investigating committee. To the extent that the committee carries
on in the "normal way," it verifies the contentions of the plaintiffs that its
purpose is one of harassment and exposure. If it does not engage in those ac-
tivities, then it cannot serve as an effective instrument of repression, and it
may as well not have been created. All the while its activities are potentially
subject to the scrutiny of the federal courts. We took an appeal to the Sixth
Circuit and announced our intention to continue the legal attack.
The filing of the suit had the additional effect of making people clearly
aware of the committee's existence and of what we believed to be its real pur-
pose. A few days after the suit was filed, the Kentucky Conference of the
American Association of University Professors passed a resolution "expressing
concern with recent developments in the state which imply limitation on full
freedom of expression and association on campuses throughout Kentucky,"
referring primarily to the establishment of the committee. 9 The respected
Louisville Courier-Journal, the only newspaper of state-wide circulation, edi-
torialized on March 31 that: "Invariably committees of this sort have been
nothing but instruments to stifle dissent and to harass individuals and institu-
tions who displease the members of the committee."7 The plaintiffs in
'On appeal we argued that Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968), which had been decided subsequently,
lent further support to this contention of "appropriate party to assert First Amendment claim."
' The Governor and the Attorney-General, who were of opposite political parties, appeared by separate
attorneys, but conducted a joint defense.
Transcript of Testimony, at 23-25, Braden v. Nunn, No. 316 (E.D. Ky., May 27, 1968).
'Louisville Courier-Journal, March 31, 1968, at ..... col ......
" The subject of the editorial was the Governor's statement that he "was distressed" that a University
of Kentucky law professor was involved as counsel, and his observation that, "We are going to have to
take a long hard look at some of the people to whom our youth are exposed."
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Braden v. Nunn also took the lead in creating Kentuckians Against KUAC,
and this organization led the "political attack" against the committee. It held
a number of workshops in Louisville and Lexington and distributed literature
throughout the state.
The relationship between the political and the legal attack was important.
The lawsuit provided the focal point for organizing against the committee,
and in a sense-primarily psychological-provided an "umbrella of protec-
tion." At all anti-KUAC meetings some of the Braden lawyers were present
and discussed the legal aspects of opposition. Persons who might be called
before the committee were assured that they would have legal representation.
In addition, the fact that the committee had been sued even before its members
had been appointed would put it "under a cloud" in the eyes of many people.
Most importantly, the opponents of the committee had taken the offensive and
the lawsuit reflected this fact. It was indeed fortunate that the initials of the
committee enabled it to be referred to as "QUACK," and, as the Courier-
Journal observed in another editorial, "Quack is the logical pronunciation and
probably summarizes the proposed activities as well as any other single word."71
The committee also was a matter of concern within the legislature itself.
The Kentucky Legislature meets ever yother year, and in the interim functions
through committees, administered by the Legislative Research Commission.
The members of these committees only receive their expenses, but the resolu-
tion establishing KUAC provided that the members would receive per diem
pay of $25 whenever they met. Only $50,000 had been appropriated for the
operations of all committees, and there was the fear that KUAC would use a
disproportionate amount of this money. As one Legislative Research Commis-
sion staff member stated privately, "Just one big witch hunt, and we're broke
for every other cause."72 The Commission asked the Attorney-General whether
it had the authority to limit appropriations to KUAC, and he replied in the
affirmative.78 Ultimately the committee was funded by the Governor out of
his contingency fund,74 which meant that it was entirely dependent upon him
for financial support.
On June 13, the Governor appointed the members of the committee and
announced that he had requested that they investigate the racial disorders
which had occurred in Louisville's West End in May." The committee met
in secret session on June 21 and announced that it would hold hearings on the
Louisville disorders in September. 6 It was the view of our Louisville people
that the purpose of these hearings would be to place the blame for the disorders
on black militants and their white supporters rather than on the conditions
that existed in the West End ghetto. The Jefferson County (Louisville) grand
"Louisville Courier-Journal, June 15, 1968, at ..... cl.
"Louisville Courier-Journal, April 12, 1968, at .... , col.
"Louisville Times, June 13, 1968, at ..... col ......
"Louisville Courier-Journal, June 14, 1968, March 29, 1969.
"Louisville Times, June 13, 1968, at ... col ......
"See 394 U.S. 100 (1969).
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jury had issued a report two days earlier, also requesting that the committee
undertake such an investigation, since "certain signs pointed to a planned
eruption."" Finally the prosecuting attorney had singled out a number of
civil rights organizations before the grand jury, and he announced that he
would turn over information on these organizations to the committee.78
This gave rise to the "second KUAC suit," Black Unity League of Ken-
tucky v. Miller.79 The plaintiffs in this suit were the organizations named by
the prosecuting attorney, and it proceeded on the same general theory as
Braden v. Nunn, except that the claim of "injury" was somewhat more direct,
because particular organizations had been singled out and presumably would
be "investigated" by the committee.8" The suit was filed on July 10, 1968.
Since the hearings were not scheduled until September 24, we were in no
hurry to proceed with the case. Organizing meetings were being held in
Louisville to make people aware of the committee's probable purpose in hold-
ing the hearings and to discuss strategies for opposing them. Again the law-
suit served as a focal point and provided the psychological "umbrella of pro-
tection." It was also agreed that if any of our people were called as witnesses
by the committee, they could intervene as plaintiffs in the suit.
It was for these reasons that we did not ask for an immediate hearing on
our motion for the convention of a three-judge court. The defendants filed a
motion to dismiss, and we assumed that this would be heard at the same time
as our motion. Much to our surprise, the District Judge had certified the
necessity for the convention of a three-judge court on his own, and on Sep-
tember 4, the three-judge court, without a hearing, entered an order dismissing
the complaint. It held that the plaintiffs were required to exhaust state reme-
dies, since in its view the resolution was not "unconstitutional on its face," and
"there have been no prosecutions and no sanctions levied against the plain-
tiffs whereby irreparable injury will result to plaintiffs from our failure to
act." We then filed a "motion for emergency relief," principally on the ground
that we had not been afforded a hearing. The court responded by invoking a
local court rule requiring that a response to any motion be filed within five
days of its receipt, and held that our failure to reply to the defendants' motion
to dismiss constituted a waiver of any claim to a hearing. We then took a
direct appeal to the Supreme Court.
The committee held its hearings at Frankfort, the state capitol, on Septem-
ber 24 and 25. It limited itself to "friendly witnesses" and did not subpoena
any of our people. However, it subsequently invited three of them to volun-
tarily appear before the committee since they had been "mentioned" at the
hearings, and under the committee's rules, this gave them the right to appear
before the committee and "defend themselves." They did not "take the bait,"
" Louisville Courier-Journal, June 22, 1968, at ..... col .....
"Louisville Times, June 20, 1968, at-..., col ......
79394 U.S. 100 (1969).
oThe suit also attacked the resolution adopted by the committee as vague and overbroad and its rules
of procedure as violative of the fourteenth amendment.
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and advised the committee that they would continue their attack on it in the
courts. The hearings produced no sensational disclosures and had little im-
pact. The committee appeared to be trying very hard to show that it was not
engaged in a "witchhunt"-as the state's lawyers had assured the court in
Braden v. Nunn-and its failure to subpoena any of our people was interpreted
as a sign of weakness on its part. Kentuckians Against KUAC continued the
"political attack," and all the while the two suits against the committee were
pending.
Its next venture involved hearings at Pikeville-the home of McSurely v.
Ratliff-in early October. Those hearings revolved around opposition to a
proposed water district, which opposition was allegedly being led by Appa-
lachian Volunteers. The basis of the opposition was that the rates were dis-
criminatory against the poor people living in the district, and it was very
effective. So few people were signing up that there was the danger that a
promised federal grant would be lost. Somehow there was something "un-
American" about all this, and the committee proceeded to investigate "Appa-
lachian problems" and the "groups and activities that might be causing strife
among the people." Again the committee limited itself primarily to "friendly
witnesses" except for the chairman of the citizens' group formed to oppose
the water district. It did not subpoena any members of the Appalachian Volun-
teers, although they were "invited" to appear before the committee, which they
refused to do. Following the two-day hearing the committee issued an Interim
Report, which concluded that, "the Appalachian Volunteer Program, particu-
larly in Pike County, has served as a tremendous detriment to the deserving
people of this region.""1 It recommended that the Governor "take whatever
steps are necessary to make certain that the Appalachian Volunteer Program is
permanently discontinued," and further recommended that "the news media
and all public officials in the State of Kentucky and Pike County, and all
Public Service Organizations endeavor to see that the Water District is put
into operation before the Federal Grant and the guaranteed loan are lost." 2
The Appalachian Volunteers subsequently filed a complaint with the Civil
Rights Division of the Department of Justice, charging that the committee was
attempting to intimidate them and prevent them from carrying on their
activities."3
By this time it seemed rather clear that the committee was unable to func-
tion as an effective instrument of repression. Opposition to the water district
continued in Pike County, as did the activities of the Appalachian Volunteers.
Representatives of Kentuckians Against KUAC met with the local people in
Pike County in anticipation of the next hearings, which were scheduled for
early December, and continued to circulate literature and sponsor programs
attacking the committee. It may have been an indication of the committee's
s' Interim Report of the Joint Legislative Committee on Un-American Activities Concerning the Pike-
ville Hearings, November 27, 1968.
'2 Id.
'At this time the Appalachian Volunteers were still receiving federal funds.
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weakness that when they finally did subpoena one of the Appalachian Volun-
teers, a local staff person, for the December hearings, she did not hesitate to
appear. Not only did she appear, but as reported in the Louisville Courier-
Journal:
A graying mother of four yesterday scolded the Kentucky Committee on Un-
American Activities for recommending that the Appalachian Volunteers be ordered
from the state without "knowing all the facts." At the same time, she accused Pike
County officials of conspiring against poor people.
Mrs. Edith Easterling, director of the Marrowbone Folk School, an Appalachian
Volunteers (AV) outpost some 20 miles south of Pikeville, told the committee that
instead of criticizing and investigating the AV's, it should go out in the hollows
and see the people who have to go to bed hungry.
"The only day poor people are recognized here is on election day," she added
later, "when they bring a bag of money out to buy their votes."
84
The Courier-Journal followed with a blistering editorial, entitled "Hearings
Threaten to Be Ridiculous":
If the Kentucky Committee on Un-American Activities is to have even nominal
value to the state, it must show fairness and responsibility in the conduct of its
investigations, and must avoid appearing ridiculous. It has failed on all of these
points in its Pike County hearings into the activities of the Appalachian Volunteers.
The most ludicrous moment of the hearings, however, came during the ques-
tioning of Mrs. Edith Easterling, who testified that she had been threatened because
of her work with the Volunteers. Asked what threats she had received, she testified
that she had gotten threatening telephone calls and that windows of her home had
been shot out.
"I don't call that threats," scoffed committee member Charles Upton. Perhaps
not. It isn't likely to be confused with a visit from the Welcome Wagon, either.
We have an idea that had a Volunteer threatened Mr. Upton with a phone call
and subsequently shot the windows out of his home, he would have considered it at
least an unfriendly gesture.85
The committee did not announce plans to hold other hearings and issued
no further reports. On March 3, 1969, the Supreme Court came down with its
decision in Black Unity League of Kentucky v. Miller."8 In a per curiam opin-
ion, Justice Douglas dissenting, it granted the defendants' motion to affirm,
observing as follows:
They (appellant organizations) did not allege that any of their officers or mem-
bers had been called as witnesses, or that any subpoenas had been issued, or that
any criminal prosecutions had been begun. The allegations of harassment were
entirely conclusionary. Appellees moved to dismiss, and appellants failed to respond,
as was required by local court rules .... We hold that in this procedural context
the trial court could take appellants' conclusionary allegations as insubstantial and
could dismiss the complaint for failure to allege sufficient irreparable injury to
justify federal intervention at this early stage.
" Louisville Courier-Journal, December 4, 1968, at .... col.....
'Louisville Courier-Journal, December 6, 1968, at . col ......
'0394 U.S. 100 (1969).
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The Sixth Circuit, which had previously denied a motion to affirm in Braden
v. Nunn, 7 now affirmed on the basis of the Supreme Court decision in Black
Unity League. The legal battle had been lost.
In retrospect, it would appear that we erred in not requesting a hearing on
our motion for the convention of a three-judge court and in ignoring the de-
fendants' motion to dismiss. Quite frankly we were unaware of the local court
rule, and expected that motion to be heard in conjunction with our motion for
convention, which was the practice the federal courts in Kentucky had fol-
lowed in other Dombrowski-type suits. Our "political-legal" strategy also
dictated that the suit be kept pending as long as possible. In any event, the
decision in Black Unity League implied that we would be able to bring another
suit if any of our people were subpoenaed, and in light of subsequent cases,
this interpretation appears to be correct."8 Our plaintiffs publicly stated that
this is what would be done.
It was unnecessary. On March 28, 1969, the newspapers reported that the
committee was "going out of business."89 It had used up its initial grant from
the Governor's contingency fund, and the Governor decided that he would
not provide any further grants. The three-man staff was discharged, and al-
though the chairman referred to the committee as being "temporarily at an-
chor," the vice-chairman and sponsor of the resolution stated that unless the
committee found some unexpected source of funds, it would likely hold no
further hearings. ° The victory was made complete when early in the 1970
legislative session, the House, by a vote of 47 to 38, refused to appropriate
money to finance the committee's operations for the next biennium."' It had
become "respectable" to vote against KUAC. The legal battle had been lost,
but the political battle had been won. The committee had been unable to
operate as an effective instrument of repression.
It would be presumptuous to say that the filing of the suits alone was the
cause of the committee's demise. Nonetheless, it is the belief of the people
who organized against the committee that the filing of those suits-the avail-
ability of the Dombrowski-type remedy-had a very significant effect upon
the ultimate political victory. Newspaper accounts of the committee's activities
always referred to the fact that it was involved in lawsuits from its inception. 2
The suits served as a rallying point for the opposition to the committee and as
we have said, provided a psychological "umbrella of protection." They also
put the committee on the defensive. Even before it was created, it promised,
through the state's attorneys, that it would not "engage in a witchhunt."93
The statements of its sponsors that it would "expose communism" and the
's No. 18,849 (6th Cir., Map 5, 1969).
"See Stamler v. Willis, 415 F.2d 1365 (7th Cir. 1969); Goldman v. Olson, 286 F. Supp. 35 (W.D.
Wisc. 1968).
'Louisville Courier-Journal, March 29, 1969, at .... col.....
@0Id.
' Louisville Courier-Journal, January 27, 1970, at ..... col ......
"Louisville Courier-Journal, March 29, 1969, at .col ......
Transcript of testimony, at 24, Braden v. Nunn, No. 316 (E.D. Ky., May 27, 1968).
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like were also disclaimed. 4 Most importantly, it was forced to carry out its
operations under the potential scrutiny of the federal courts. If it did attempt
to operate as an instrument of repression, it would make federal intervention
all the more probable, but if it was to avoid such intervention, it could not do
what it was set up to do. All that can be said is that the Kentucky Un-American
Activities Committee was not able to repress efforts to bring about social
change, and in the view of those who organized against it, the filing of the
suits was a very significant factor in this regard. If it had not been for the
availability of the Dombrowski-type remedy, notwithstanding the fact that the
suits were not "legally successful," the history of KUAC in Kentucky might
have been very different. At least many so believe.
IV. CONCLUSION
This two-part article has attempted to assess the significances of the Dom-
browski-type remedy in redressing the balance between those who seek to
achieve social change and those who would use their control of the organs
of government to resist it. It is the author's thesis that the availability of the
Dombrowski-type remedy goes very far to redress the balance, and that this
may only to some extent be affected by the outcome of the legal action. To
the author this demonstrates most clearly how the law of remedies does indeed
operate as a social institution.
"Id. at 24-25.
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